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There is but one way to avert that ruin: the economic
federation of Europe’s continental democracies….This is
the only road to salvation, alike for European politics
and European industry. (Coudenhove-Kalergi,
1923, p. 70, author’s own translation)
1. Introduction
Before the European integration project started to insti-
tutionalize into the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) in 1951, many ideas floated around on how to
shape European integration. Already during the interwar-
period and during World War II (WWII) there were sev-
eral plans that envisioned a united Europe. These inter-
war years were the “first golden age” of the European
ideal among intellectuals (Lacroix & Nicolaïdis, 2010). Re-
cently, Cattani (2017) combined conceptual history with
discourse analysis to examine the meaning of concepts
such as “European homeland” and “European nation”
in the context of the two intellectual conferences orga-
nized by the League of Nations in 1933. Similarly, Ifversen
(2002) analyzed the interconnected notions of crisis, civ-
ilization and Europe in the interwar era.
This article aims to further expand on this by ex-
plicitly focusing on the role of emotional vocabulary in
relation to the meaning of key concepts of European
unity. To this end, it analyzes a canonical text of the time,
with a transnational outreach: Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
Pan-Europa (1923).
There is ample research on the postwar process of
European integration based on a rationalist account of
European integration as the outcomeof the autonomous
calculations of different nation states based on their
economic, political or military interests (e.g., Milward,
1992), and ideational accounts focusing on transnational
networks, their norms and institutions, that pushed
for European integration (e.g., Kaiser, 2007; Lipgens,
1968; Müller, 2004). While Lipgens’ (1968) work on the
blueprints of national resistance movements has been
criticized for its “normative overdrive” (Kaiser, 2007),
it shows that there is a wide variety of blueprints of
Europe that transcend particular national views. While
these networks did not necessarily produce a common
political European idea, they provided a forum for col-
lective learning, and fostered mutual understanding and
trust (Kaiser, 2004). Moreover, they created normative-
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emotional bonds able to withstand domestic/nationalist
pressures (Kaiser, 2007).
Concerning the interwar-period, numerous transna-
tional networks can be identified that did contribute to
these normative-emotional bonds, such as the Roman-
Catholic networks (Secrétariat International des Par-
tis Démocratiques d’Inspiration Chrétienne), ecumenical
networks (Life & Work, Faith & Order) and business net-
works (Council of Directors of European Industrial Feder-
ations [CDEIF]; Colpach-Group).
However, little is known of the ways in which these
substantive ideas for a future European order were con-
nected with specific emotives and emotional beliefs.
Hence, building upon the “emotional turn” in interna-
tional relations (IR), this article develops a framework of
analysis that highlights the role of emotives and emo-
tional beliefs that were evoked in these transnational
visions of Europe, and that served to create moral and
political support for them. In particular, it aims to show
how experience and expectation are connected by emo-
tives. As such, the focus on how emotives are used to
strengthen the substantive ideas (moral/spiritual, polit-
ical and economic) gives us new insights on how a fu-
ture Europe was invoked and made attractive to a wider
public/audience.
Moreover, beyond the topic of European integration,
this article aims to advance research on emotions in IR.
While the literature remained rather theoretical or fo-
cused on single emotions to account for decision-making
failures (Sasley, 2011; see also Bleiker & Hutchinson,
2008), the methodology of studying emotions in (the his-
tory) of IR gainedmore attention recently (see Clément&
Sangar, 2018). Building upon Koschut (2018b), I develop
an emotion discourse analysis, distinguishing between
two types of emotion (enmity and amity), enriched by
combining this with Koselleck’s (2005) notions of “space
of experience” and “horizon of expectation”. As such this
article engages with the need for more structured, sys-
tematic empirical research on emotive vocabulary in Eu-
ropean integration history.
The central aim of this article is to examine how par-
ticular emotives and emotional beliefs were used to gain
support for a specific and salient blueprint of European
integration. To what extent and how are the experiences
and expectations, as expressed in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
Pan-Europa, informed by emotives?
Blueprints are understood here as a set of moral/
spiritual, economic and political ideas about a future Eu-
ropean order, that are expressed in a particular emotive
vocabulary. The next section discusses the relationship
between ideas, emotives and emotional beliefs in gen-
eral, and emotion discourse analysis in particular. Sub-
sequently, I introduce Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europa
(1923) as a canonical text, and emotional landmark,
of interwar writings on European unity. In Sections 4
and 5 I analyze the emotive vocabulary of Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s text, focusing on the “space of experience” he
refers to and his outline of Europe’s future (“horizon of
expectation”). In Section 6, based on secondary litera-
ture, I reflect upon the emotionalizing effect, reception
and response.
2. Emotive Turn
2.1. Ideas, Emotives and Emotional Beliefs
The emotional turn in IR builds on research in the history
and politics of emotions. Frevert’s (2011)work on the his-
tory of emotions is well-known, showing that our under-
standing of emotions has changed over time. Moreover,
in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Ahmed (2014) aims
to show how the emotionality of text connects individu-
als to a collective, which includes some at the expense
of others.
Research on emotions in IR consists of both macro-
theoretical approaches that develop generalizable
propositions about political emotions, and micro-
approaches that examine specific emotions in specific
contexts, often decision-making failures (Hutchison &
Bleiker 2014; see also Sasley, 2011). The “emotional
turn” in IR encompasses a wide variety of approaches
and concepts, ranging from a focus on individual sub-
jective experiences (emotions) and bodily expressions
(affection) to more collective systems of feeling (emo-
tional communities, Rosenwein, 2010; Koschut, 2018a),
emotional cultures (Moïsi, 2009), institutionalized emo-
tional norms (emotional regimes, Reddy, 2001; see also
Crawford, 2000) and conceptual/abstract expressions
(emotional beliefs, Mercer, 2010).
This article does not engagewith questions about the
biological or cultural basis of emotion, but rather con-
ceives of emotional expressions as a strategy to constrain
or enable particular substantive ideas about Europe. As
such, it does not refer to emotions, but emotives. Emo-
tives are expressed emotions (i.e., emotional vocabulary)
that are instrumental in changing, building, hiding and in-
tensifying emotions that are accepted and recognized in
a particular community (see Reddy, 2001, p. 105). Emo-
tions are inadmissibly present in any political discourse,
however much this discourse tries to present its lan-
guage in impartial, objective and rational means. In fact,
doing so is in itself an emotional strategy, in the sense
that it tries to channel specific “non-emotional” emo-
tions, in order to render its contents more convincing.
Of equal importance in the analysis are emotional be-
liefs (Mercer, 2010). In contrast to emotives that refer
to basic emotions, emotional beliefs are more abstract
concepts that integrate emotion and cognition (Mercer,
2010, p. 2). Examples of emotional beliefs, in the context
of this article, are nationalism, responsibility, solidarity
and reconciliation. Emotion is not an addition to these
concepts, but is an essential component for understand-
ing its meaning (Mercer, 2010, p. 7). These conceptual-
izations of emotives and emotional beliefs point out that,
although research on emotions is often focused on the
level of the individual, there is also a strong collective
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and political dimension to it: “[Emotions] frame what is
and is not possible in politics. They reveal and conceal,
enable and disable” (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014, p. 508).
Moreover, they contribute to identity formation, possi-
bly resulting in an emotional community.
As such, emotions are closely tied tomorals in at least
two ways. First, emotional regimes prescribe what emo-
tives are “appropriate”. As such, morals precede emo-
tions. However, emotions and morals also are in a consti-
tutive relationship. So-calledmoral emotions entail a cer-
tain judgment, condemning others (i.e., contempt, anger
and disgust), or praising others (i.e., gratitude, awe, ele-
vation) (Haidt, 2003).
It is the connection between ideas and emotives that
serves as a mobilization for action. Without ideas, emo-
tives have not object, and without emotives, ideas fail
“to produce a sense of obligation or loyalty necessary for
collective action” (Koschut, 2018b, p. 286).
2.2. Emotion Discourse Analysis
An emotion discourse analysis looks into the emotion
potential and emotionalizing effect of political discourse
(Koschut, 2018b) and is concerned not so much with
the frequencies of specific emotives, but rather with
the prevalence of certain emotional patterns/structures,
i.e., a certain combination of emotives and emotional
beliefs. These master emotives “structure the social
meanings and effects of the discourse and thus set the
collective standard of emotional expression” (Koschut,
2018b, p. 294).
This article combines emotion and time in discourse
(see also Skonieczny, 2018, p. 70). Concerning emo-
tive vocabulary, I distinguish between emotions associ-
ated with amity (i.e., empathy, pride, gratitude, grief,
honor, respect, compassion and sympathy) and enmity
(i.e., fear, anger, disgust, hatred, jealousy, rage) (Koschut,
2014). Moreover, building upon Koselleck (2005), I distin-
guish between the “space of experience” and “horizon
of expectation” of this emotional vocabulary. No emo-
tive can be crafted and disseminated without the pre-
supposition of an existing, collective reservoir of experi-
ences and expectations to tap into. “Space of experience”
refers to references to past experiences and reflections
on the state of affairs. “Horizon of expectation” refers
to references to a future European order. Both can be
combined by a positive, inclusive emotional vocabulary
or a more negative, exclusive emotional vocabulary (see
Table 1). So, negative backward emotions are anger and
hatred, whilst trust is a positive emotion with reference
to experience. In contrast, forward looking emotions are
fear and hope. An example of an emotive that connects
experience with expectation is revenge, i.e., it refers to
anger based on the past, with the conviction to make up
for that in the future. These emotives are not an exhaus-
tive list, but rather examples to show the connection be-
tween emotives and notions of time. Moreover, while
analytically distinctive, empirically these emotions may
be intertwined. The connection of past and future, of ex-
perience and expectation, leads to particular blueprints
of Europe.
The emotion discourse analysis proceeds in three
steps (Koschut, 2018b). First, the selection of texts (Sec-
tion 3). Second, the mapping of verbal expressions of
emotions (Sections 4 and 5). Third, interpreting and con-
textualizing its political effects (Section 6).
3. Pan-Europa as Emotional Landmark
For the purpose of this article, a canonical text on Eu-
ropean unity in the interwar period has been selected:
Coudenhove-Kalergi Pan-Europa (1923).
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writings are among the first of
blueprints of European unity in the interwar-era. Dur-
ing this “first golden age” of intellectual debate on Eu-
ropean unity over 600 articles were published on the
topic between 1919 and 1939,with a peak between1925
and the early 1930s (Chabot, 2005, p. 14). While the in-
terwar period was characterized by intellectual debate
on European unity, it was also a period of thriving na-
tionalism. In the same year that Pan-Europa was pub-
lished, national socialist party leader Hitler called for a
“national revolution”, in strong emotives: “what moti-
vates us is neither self-conceit or self-interest, but only
a burning desire to join the battle in this grave eleventh
hour for our German Fatherland” (Frevert, 2015). More-
over, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s work has been compared to
Rohan’s Europa (published in 1924 at the same pub-
lisher as Pan-Europa), which proposed a culturally united
Europe built on a shared Catholic basis (Prettenthaler-
Ziegerhofer, 2013, pp. 167, 176). With 16,000 copies
being sold in 1926 Pan-Europa was a best-seller at
its time (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2012). Translated in
many languages it also had a clear transnational reach
and was discussed in transnational settings such as the
Pan-European conferences that Coudenhove-Kalergi or-
ganized as part of his Pan-European Union. At the first
conference, in 1926, 2,000 participants from 24 nations
gathered in Vienna. As such, the Pan-European Union
“constituted a public space where both the meaning of
Table 1. Coding scheme emotion discourse analysis.
Space of Experience Horizon of Expectation
Enmity Hatred, Anger Fear
Revenge
Amity Trust Hope
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Europe and the vision of a united Europewere discussed”
and “provoked new conceptualisations of Europe as a
bearer of common identity” (Orluc, 2002, pp. 25, 43).
Although Coudenhove-Kalergi, born in 1894, did
have a Catholic background, he “generally ignored
the theology of his time” (Sorrels, 2016, p. 213). His
biographer Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer (2001) classifies
Coudenhove-Kalergi as a Christian socialist. As we will
see, his work consists of emotives with a strong reli-
gious connotation.
Coudenhove-Kalergi’s approach is based on a neo-
aristocracy, i.e., a blend of “forward-looking enthusiasm
for technological and industrial progress and a backward-
looking authoritarian elitism” (Sorrels, 2016, p. 137).
While Coudenhove-Kalergi opposed Hitler and was un-
equivocal in his condemnation of Nazi anti-Semitism, he
flirtedwithMussolini’s fascism, emphasizing the need for
a “wisemixture of the authoritarian and aristocratic prin-
ciple with what can be healthy in the democratic princi-
ple [conceding] room to justice and the enlightened com-
mand of superior personalities” (Evola, 1933/2015, p. 47;
see also Coudenhove-Kalergi , 1934, pp. 94–96).
While initially a great admirer of the American Pres-
ident Woodrow Wilson, Coudenhove-Kalergi became
strongly disappointed in Woodrow Wilson’s League of
Nations, which suffered from utopian overstretch and
did too little for the European dream of a unified conti-
nent: “Wilson’s attempt to set up an ecumenical League
of Nations has failed” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 20).
Coudenhove-Kalergi eventually abandoned his support
for the League of Nations in favor of a United States of
Europe, inspired by Fried’s Pan-Amerika (1910)1. In this,
he pitted his plan for Europe squarely against the ‘Red In-
ternational’, channeling both conservative, 19th century
concert ideas and new, fascist dreams for a rejuvenated
European unification. As we will see, he does so by posit-
ing negative emotives of revenge and destruction against
positive emotives of reconciliation and understanding.
The United States of Europe is presented as the 6th
Europe, after Hellas, Roman empire, Völkerwanderung,
Roman-Catholic Europe, and the era of enlightened abso-
lutism. This way Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923, pp. 31–33)
presents Pan-Europa as a continuation of a century old
project. This Pan-Europa would consist of 26 states (ex-
cluding England and Russia)2. After a Pan-European con-
ference, the participating countries would sign an obliga-
tory arbitration and guarantee treaty, eventually leading
to a customs union. So, Coudenhove-Kalergi prioritizes
political and security integration over economic integra-
tion, i.e., a customs union is to be developed only after
political treaties and security pacts are agreed upon.
The life and work of this Austrian-Japanese politi-
cian and philosopher have been evaluated rather neg-
atively in the EU integration history literature; he was
ineffective (Horner, 2001), and a marginal political fig-
ure (Milward, 1997). His political ideas have been criti-
cized as well: “As a blueprint it was imprecise, naïve and
optimistic” (White, 1989). Nevertheless, Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s movement was well-known and contributed to
a coalition of idealism and commercial interests that
was of importance after WWII (Klemann, 1966). Hon-
orary president of the Pan-Europa Movement and Prime
Minister of France, Aristide Briand, proposed a Euro-
pean Federal Union in 1930 at the League of Nations. Af-
ter the war, with the emergence of many other move-
ments for European integration, Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
position was less central. However, his work was ac-
knowledged, as he was mentioned by Churchill in his fa-
mous speech at the University of Zürich in 1946: “Much
work has been done upon this task by the exertions of
the Pan-European Union, which owes so much to the
famous French patriot and statesman Aristide Briand
(Churchill, 1946).” Moreover, he was awarded the first
Charlemagne Prize in 1950, acknowledging his efforts for
promoting European unity.
Hence, although contested, his writings have been
central to the interwar thinking about European unity.
As such this text is taken as an “emotional landmark”
(Koschut, 2018b).3 As a product of its time, Pan-Europa
is a telling example of the use of emotive vocabulary in
the interwar years. It tells us something about the recog-
nized and accepted emotions among the transnational
European elites of that time.
4. Space of Experience in Pan-Europa
In this section I will take a closer look at the emotional
vocabulary of Coudenhove-Kalergi concerning Europe’s
past and how he understands this to affect his contempo-
raries’ emotional outlook. First, we identify Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s understanding of emotions in international pol-
itics. Second, we will see how Coudenhove-Kalergi con-
nects the key emotives of his time (hate and fear) with
(a) an emotional belief in nationalism, and (b) a narrow
space of experience.
4.1. Emotions Trump Interests
While the role of emotions in inter-state relations is de-
bated (see Bleiker & Hutchison, 2018), in Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s writings they are omnipresent. He argues that
“not only are political relations between states func-
tions of national sympathy and antipathy—but national
friendships and enmities are also often functions of
political relations” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 122).
Coudenhove-Kalergi even claims that the emotional di-
1 For an extensive discussion of the relationship between Fried’s work and that of Coudenhove-Kalergi , see Sorrels (2016).
2 England had transformed into “an oceanic empire” with non-European interests, and Russia distanced itself from the democratic system of Europe by
proclaiming Sovietism (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 33).
3 Other relevant writings of Coudenhove-Kalergi in this period consist of Paneuropa ABC (1931), Kampf um Paneuropa (1925) and Europe Must
Unite (1938).
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mension of the relations among states (Germany and
France in particular) trumps rationality and interests4,
and that these emotions are artificially created over
centuries for political-military purposes (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1923, pp. 121–122)—a typical expression of
a lingering 19th century preference for “concert” and
great power understanding and deliberation (De Graaf,
in press).
4.2. Hate, Fear and Nationalism
The defining space of experience, against which
Coudenhove-Kalergi writes Pan-Europa is World War I
(WWI). Against this backdrop, the master emotives that
Coudenhove-Kalergi identifies are: hate (Hass) and fear
(Furcht)5. These emotives of jealousy, hatred, envy, re-
venge, and malice6 fuel a vicious circle of eternal fight
in which Europe tumbles from one crisis to another.
Coudenhove-Kalergi connects these emotives of hate
and jealousy to nationalism and argues that this toxic
combination of national hate and national jealousy re-
sults in a descent, from month to month, of the spiri-
tual andmaterial European culture (Coudenhove-Kalergi,
1923, p. 68). Feelings of hate trump those of solidar-
ity (p. 71).
As such, it is the “national chauvinist”, who in prop-
agating a European war shows that blind hate against
the enemy is stronger than love of one’s own (p. 101),
that is Coudenhove-Kalergi ’s (1923) main antagonist. On
Coudenhove-Kalergi ’s (1923) list of opponents, they are
followed by the communists, militarists and protected in-
dustries (p. 162). Russia is seen as merely taking advan-
tage of Europe’s internal weakness. Coudenhove-Kalergi
(1923) even seemed to resist too much of an Ameri-
can interference in European matters: “neither the West
nor the East will save Europe: Russia wants to conquer
Europe, America wants to buy it” (p. XI).
4.3. A Narrow Space of Experience
Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923) observes that the space of
experience expands. Because of technical progress, the
world becomes smaller (p. 18). Hence, in terms of the
“space” of these emotives, Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923)
notes that the effects of these feelings of hate are
not restricted to the European continent but contami-
nate the international atmosphere (p. 23). He refers to
Europe as an eternal source of uncertainty and anxiety,
with analogy to the tempestuous developments in the
Balkans (p. 24). Moreover, taking an outside-in perspec-
tive, Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923) portrays an image of
Europe as once being “feared”, but now “pitied” and de-
rided by the upcoming powers (pp. 17, 27).
This progress in the rest of the world contrasted
with Europe’s decline (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. VIII)
is due to the fact that the (technical) abilities to ex-
pand the horizon of expectations are not grasped by
his contemporaries—they lack the necessary imagina-
tion (Phantasie) and are backward-looking, according to
Coudenhove-Kalergi (1923, p. 98). Because of a lack of
imagination, Coudenhove-Kalergi sees the European pol-
itics of his days as yesterday’s politics rather than the pol-
itics of tomorrow (1923, p. VIII). Instead of focusing on
how to prevent a future war, more space in the discus-
sions is given to the last war (1923). This experience of
war is a too weak foundation to prevent another one7.
So, in Coudenhove-Kalergi ’s understanding, the eter-
nal focus on “yesterday” is the main cause of Eu-
rope’s fragmentation (1923, p. VIII). Hence, he suggests
the following tactic: Das Übermorgen gegen das Mor-
gen ausspielen [To Set the Day after Tomorrow Against
Tomorrow] (p. 87). In other words, he aims to propose to
widen the horizon of expectation and accuses his oppo-
nents of limiting that same horizon and only looking back.
5. Horizon of Expectation in Pan-Europa
In this section we will look at the use of emotional vo-
cabulary by Coudenhove-Kalergi regarding his proposed
future European order. He distinguishes between two
options—a third option does not exist (1923, p. 54). The
fight between anti-European and pan-European is a fight
between “Vergangenheit und Zukunft” (p. 168). Key to
this choice for a Europe of the past, or a Europe of the
future, is the Franco-German relationship.
5.1. Anti-Europe: Europe of the Past—Revenge &
Destruction
The default option is to continue on the road of hate,
which would inevitably cause Europe’s demise, con-
quered by the upcoming powers (i.e., the United States
and Russia) (1923, pp. 21–22). This default option is
based on a vicious circle of French politics of destruc-
tion and a German politics of revenge. Unforgiveness
on both sides lead to a politics of respectively destruc-
tion and revenge (p. 134). These two are closely inter-
linked, and Coudenhove-Kalergi is very much aware of
the strength of revenge politics: it is fueled by every act
of violence (p. 131).
5.2. Pan-Europe: Europe of the Future—Reconciliation &
Understanding
Against this grim picture, Coudenhove-Kalergi proposes
his alternative, almost eschatological, horizon of salva-
4 “Never was the hate between Germans and French bigger than it is now. This hatred for each other is stronger than reason, stronger than their common
interest” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, pp. 121–122, author’s own translation).
5 “Everywhere there is misery, unrest, discontent, hatred and fear” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. VIII, author’s own translation).
6 “These states of theWest are disjointed and disorganized, in everlasting conflict with one another, and torn by hatred and jealousy (Coudenhove-Kalergi,
1923, p. 23)”; “controlled by mutual hatred and envy, by revenge and resentment” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 95).
7 “To base the hope for peace on this foundation is short-sighted and hopeless” (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 104, author’s own translation).
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tion, or redemption (Rettung), liberation and solidar-
ity: European economic integration, based on a political
union (1923, pp. IX, 27, 70). The pan-European horizon
that Coudenhove-Kalergi aims to providewould bebased
on a French politics of reconciliation (Versöhnung) and
a German politics of understanding (Verständigung) (pp.
124–128). This almost eschatological and salvific hori-
zon unites the “fallen men” of Europe with their once
so greatly ordained destiny; thereby channeling a typi-
cal sense of Christian teleology into the political realm.
To step towards this horizon, this Christian notion of re-
demption and reconciliation also entails a break with
the past; redemption does not arrive automatically—the
way needs to be paved with sacrifices and personal en-
gagement (1923, p. 71).
The notion of sacrifice was a key emotive used as
part of the war culture rhetoric (Horne, 2004) that
Coudenhove-Kalergi is so strongly opposing. Rather than
referring to sacrifice as a way to claim moral compen-
sation and renewing antagonism, Coudenhove-Kalergi
uses this vocabulary in combination with the notion
of reconciliation.
To pave the way for reconciliation and understanding
would require a magnanimous, generous and redemp-
tive act (grossmütiger Akt) of France to “teach Germany
to believe in the French will to reconciliation to strike
a deadly blow to the politics of revenge” (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1923, p. 131). In particular, Coudenhove-Kalergi
thinks of “a voluntary renunciation of the occupation of
the Rhine” in exchange for an “inter-European guarantee
treaty” (1923). This shows that, in Coudenhove-Kalergi’s
understanding, pan-Europe provides the necessary con-
ditions for a politics of reconciliation.
The notion of reconciliation is of course closely con-
nected to that of sacrifice (Opfer):
Those who love Europe must not shy away from any
sacrifice in order to save their continent from thismor-
tal danger. (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 97, author’s
own translation)
This quote also underlines the point that while
Coudenhove-Kalergi speaks about the relationship be-
tween France and Germany at a state-level, he also calls
on every individual citizen to assume its responsibility.
Neutrality in this question of “life and death” is not pos-
sible, running away from a decision is high treason (1923,
p. 102). Moreover, it recognizes the feelings of enmity.
To break the resistance against Pan-Europa,
Coudenhove-Kalergi looks for an awakening (Erwachen)
of a pan-European feeling of solidarity (1923, p. 109).
This awakening suggests that solidarity is already there,
it only has to be activated. Coudenhove-Kalergi distin-
guishes between two types of solidarity—a solidarity of
love and a solidarity of reason. He primarily refers to
the latter, i.e., the awareness that the ruin of the other
would bring about one’s own ruin, would suffice in first
instance (1923, p. 124).
In his opposition of anti-European and Pan-European
Coudenhove-Kalergi is careful not to position national
identity against a pan-European identity. Rather, he
refers to Pan-Europe as Übervaterland (1923, p. 156). In
later writings he further expands on this relationship be-
tween European and national identity, arguing that “just
as love for the mother does not detract love for the fa-
ther, neither does love for the European Mutterland re-
duce love for the national Vaterländern” (Coudenhove-
Kalergi, 1931, p. 17). So, national and European identity
are no zero-sum relationship (perhaps: “are notmutually
exclusive”). This image of the family has a strong emo-
tional connotation, referring to a given relationship—
whether you like it or not. Against the background of the
suffering caused by WWI, the maternal reference to Eu-
rope underlines its emotional and pacifist connotation
(Cattani, 2017, pp. 677–678)8.
5.3. A Narrowing Horizon of Expectation
As long as there is a democratic regime in Germany,
Coudenhove-Kalergi deems it is not too late for reconcili-
ation. Nevertheless, he is pessimistic about the time that
is left (Coudenhove-Kalergi, 1923, p. 131). His book aims
to underscore the urgent need of European unity, before
the horizon of expectation will narrow again. The United
States of Europe is “the only salvation from the chaos of
the present—before the collapse of the future” (p. 39).
6. Emotionalizing Effects, Reception & Response
Central to Pan-Europe, and Coudenhove-Kalergi’s writ-
ings in general, is its rather dichotomous character.
Coudenhove-Kalergi integrates a sense of time with
particular emotives and emotional beliefs. The anti-
European option is based on backward-looking emo-
tives of enmity, whereas the pan-European order is re-
ferred to in terms of forward-looking emotives of amity
(Figure 1).
Coudenhove-Kalergi did recognize the dominance
of emotives of enmity among his contemporaries and
aimed to expand their horizon of expectation to con-
ceive of a different European order. At his Pan-European
Congresses he aimed to practise these notions of
reconciliation—a highly Christian infused and morally
laden emotive—and solidarity—a more social and sec-
ularized one. When the German government discussed
whether to officially participate in the 2nd Pan-European
Congress in Berlin in 1930, Minister of the Interior Wirth,
argued in favour with reference to this notion of recon-
ciliation (Prettenthaler-Ziegerhofer, 2001).
Although Coudenhove-Kalergi strongly connects
emotion to mobilize forces for his Pan-European or-
der, his Pan-European movement has not proved able
8 Other interwar intellectuals referring to Europe as maternal at symposia initiated by the League of Nations in 1933 in Paris and Madrid are the French
Jesuit Yves de la Briere and writer Georges Duhamel (see Cattani, 2017, pp. 675, 677).
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Backward-looking
Europe
hate, rage, revenge, 
destrucon, naonalism
Forward-looking Europe
salvaon, liberaon,
reconciliaon,
understanding, solidarity
Figure 1. Emotional discourse Pan-Europa.
to change the course of history. As Coudenhove-Kalergi
(1943) himself points out in his memoirs, his movement
was supported by many individual members of govern-
ments, but at a more official level, governments ignored
it. Opposition did not only come from nationalist groups,
but also from pacifists accusing Coudenhove-Kalergi
of advocating a Machiavellian pacifism (Prettenthaler-
Ziegerhofer, 2013, p. 163). Coudenhove-Kalergi (1943)
recalls that he had not expected Hitler to take over
Germany: “When I came back to Germany in 1924, the
Hitler chapter seemed definitely closed”. Nevertheless,
his fear of another cycle of rage and destruction politics
came true.
7. Conclusion
While research on the interwar plans for European inte-
gration is well developed, much less is known about the
emotive vocabulary that is involved in those “blueprints
of Europe”. To this end, this article analyzed Coudenhove-
Kalergi’s canonical text Pan-Europa.
Central to his experience is WWI and the hate be-
tween Germany and France. This hate is combined with
a strong inclination to look back. As such it leads to a vi-
cious circle of destruction and revenge. These negative
emotives associated with nationalism as emotional be-
lief feed into Coudenhove-Kalergi’s plan for an alterna-
tive European political order which is centered on the
emotional and spiritual belief of reconciliation, sacrifice
and solidarity—invoking a moralistic appeal and call to
action. Coudenhove-Kalergi uses fear of the past to urge
his audience to expand their horizon of expectation, and
to mobilize their inner redemptive drive. He aims to ex-
pand this horizon of expectation with an almost eschato-
logical plan for European unity, in which these negative
emotions would turn into feelings of solidarity. While he
acknowledges that a solidarity of love may be a bit too
much, he calls for a solidarity of reason—and for great
acts of sacrifice to meet these high-pitched stakes.
Using Koselleck’s (2005)meta-historical categories of
space of experience and horizon of expectation allows
one to contextualize this emotive vocabulary. We have
seen how Coudenhove-Kalergi aimed to connect the
emotive of sacrifice to a politics of reconciliation, rather
than destruction and resentment. While Coudenhove-
Kalergi’sPan-Europa is strong in usingmoral and religious
emotives to mobilize his audience, it was not success-
ful in preventing another vicious cycle of French-German
politics of hate. As such, this article highlights the con-
straining force of emotives of enmity on what can be
imagined as possible horizons.
This emotion discourse analysis of Pan-Europa has
been a limited exercise. There are, at least, three ways
to further expand on this analysis. First, compare Pan-
Europawith Coudenhove-Kalergi’s emotional vocabulary
after the war. This would allow to reflect upon the rela-
tionship between emotives and crisis. Second, compare
Pan-Europa with the emotional vocabulary of contem-
poraries (e.g., Briand’s Federal European Union, 1930;
Rohan’s Europa, 1924). It would allow one to assess to
what extent and how Coudenhove-Kalergi’s notions of
reconciliation and solidarity resonated with contempo-
rary political elites, and to what extent religiously in-
spired idiom still could find a home in European politics.
As Frevert (2015) shows, the Nazi politics of emotions
drew also on religious semantics tomobilize its audience.
Third, methodologically it would be of interest to inves-
tigate in what ways an analysis of the images (i.e., book
covers, symbols) confirm the emotion discourse analysis.
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